By: Yehuda Gannon
On September 9, 2025, the Israeli Air Force conducted “Operation Summit of Fire,” a targeted operation that sought to eliminate high-profile Hamas leaders living in Qatar. The list of targeted individuals included Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammed Ismail Darwish, and Khaled Mashal, all senior members of Hamas’s leadership. What distinguished this operation from previous Israeli actions was that it occurred in a country that neither attacked nor was planning to attack Israel.
Despite initial reports of success, the Israeli assessment in the days afterward indicated that the strike failed to achieve its intended results. Hamas announced that five of its members and one Qatari security officer were killed. The Israeli operation was widely condemned, including by the Arab League, the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, and even the United States. The strikes also caused strains on ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, as Qatar mentioned that it would distance itself from its role as mediator.
Prime Minister Netanyahu, under heavy pressure from President Donald Trump, recently called the Qatari Emir to apologize for the incident and for violating Qatar’s sovereignty. Before the call, however, Qatari officials had expressed interest in pursuing legal action against Israel in the International Criminal Court, arguing that the strikes were illegal. While dramatic ceasefire developments have occurred in the Middle East over the last week, the Israeli operation still raises important questions: (1) should Qatar continue to play the role of a “neutral mediator” in this conflict and possible future ones, especially while the country continues to host Hamas within its borders, and (2) do any legal justifications exist under international law for Israel’s actions against Hamas in Doha?
Before focusing on the legality of the Israeli strike, it is crucial to begin by zooming out and understanding the complicated and confusing role Qatar plays in the Middle East that ultimately culminated in Israel’s actions.
Qatar positions itself as a close U.S. ally. Recently, President Trump visited Qatar as part of his second term’s first major foreign policy trip. During the trip, Qatar pledged $1.2 trillion in economic commitments between the two countries. Strategically, Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest U.S. foreign military base in the Middle East.
Paradoxically, Qatar has not only harbored Hamas’s political leadership since 2012, but has fostered its continued existence, growth, and operations. While true estimates vary, Qatar has provided more than $1.8 billion to Hamas over the years. Qatar also maintains close relations with Iran, a designated state sponsor of terrorism and longtime supporter of Hamas. Qatar strategically navigates the geopolitical tensions of the Middle East by playing “both sides.” Interestingly, Qatar does not formally recognize Israel, yet has acted as the primary mediator between Israel and Hamas since the war began.
While many have criticized Israel’s military actions in Doha, it is vital to also question the seriousness of continuing to allow Qatar to serve as a central mediator in hostage negotiations when it both uses financial incentives as a means of control, continues to host Hamas within its borders (a U.S., EU, and Israel-designated terrorist organization), and aligns itself closely with Iran. The culmination of these various factors led to the consequential Israeli operation on September 9.
If Qatar were to bring legal action, would Israel have any legal justifications for its conduct?
One of the basic principles under international law is that of sovereignty, enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Sovereignty is a “political concept” that refers to the distribution and exercise of power. A central component of sovereignty is that it “implies autonomy,” granting sovereign powers protection from external interference.
Sections 3 and 4 of Article 2 require member states to settle international disputes peacefully and to refrain from the use of force against the territorial independence or integrity of another nation, respectively. However, an important exception to Article 2 can be found in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 provides that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
While Article 51 was historically construed narrowly, the UN expanded the scope of the Article via several binding resolutions in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks. Resolution 1368 (2001), adopted the day after 9/11, recognized and reaffirmed the right to self-defense. Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted on September 28, 2001, expanded Resolution 1368, providing more specific language that has increased Article 51’s scope and allowed for the development of two critical yet controversial doctrines under international law: (1) the “harboring doctrine” and (2) the “unwilling or unable doctrine.” In the context of the Qatar strikes, Israel’s self-defense claims are in response to Hamas’s October 7 attacks, the worst terrorist attack in Israel’s history.
Section 2 of Resolution 1373 makes clear that states shall “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens.” Furthermore, “states shall prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens.”
Numerous countries have invoked this doctrine to justify targeted strikes against terrorist opponents in other states. Most notably, the U.S. itself has invoked this doctrine to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Beyond the U.S., numerous other countries—such as France, Turkey, India, and Russia—have launched targeted attacks in countries or regions under the harboring doctrine.
Because Hamas is a designated terrorist organization by Israel and several other Western countries, Qatar, in Israel’s view, is in active violation of Resolution 1373. The resolution applies to all UN member nations, of which Qatar is one. Additionally, Qatar continues to provide a safe haven for Hamas’s leaders, has historically facilitated the financing of Hamas in Gaza, and is using Qatari sovereignty as a shield to immunize Hamas’s leadership from any Israeli retaliation.
The unwilling or unable doctrine is another doctrine that has emerged through interpretations of Article 51. The doctrine applies to countries “unwilling or unable” to deal with non-state actors within their borders. Historically, previous strikes have targeted individuals in states often widely regarded as failed states that are truly unable to deal with the threats within their own borders. This doctrine was used to justify U.S. airstrikes in Syria in 2014.
There is no question that Hamas initiated an attack against Israel on October 7, 2023. While some could question whether Hamas’s political leadership are active military targets under international humanitarian law, this case is unique compared to similar operations conducted by both the U.S., Israel, and other nations. While many of the previous cases dealt with countries unable to deal with the threat, Qatar is indeed able to confront Hamas if it wanted. Some, such as Michael Schmitt, an international law scholar, have argued that Israel did not exhaust all remedies before initiating the strike. However, Israel has previously criticized Qatar publicly for hosting Hamas in Doha and for not applying enough pressure to release the hostages held by Hamas. As such, Qatar’s acceptance of Hamas’s continued presence in Doha despite Israeli objections is likely sufficient to justify their strike under the “unwilling” prong of the doctrine because of Qatar’s open acceptance of the group within its territorial borders.
To justify an attack in self-defense under international law, there must be both (1) necessity and (2) proportionality.
Proportionality is less of an issue here. Proportionality is a limitation on defensive force to only that which is “required to defend against an imminent or ongoing attack.” Here, Israel specifically targeted the headquarters where the senior Hamas leaders were meeting at the time, and the intended targets were the leaders of Hamas.
However, there is more nuance to the question of necessity. Many have argued that the strikes were unjustified, claiming that Israel’s actions derailed rather than stabilized hostage and ceasefire negotiations. However, the necessity prong asks “whether non-forcible measures standing alone are likely to address the situation.” Here, the answer is clearly no. First, the Gaza War has raged on for nearly two years. Israel, the U.S., and even Qatar have been frustrated with Hamas’s leaders for engaging in negotiations in bad faith. Second, necessity exists because of Israel’s desire to rescue the forty-eight remaining hostages in Gaza, many of whom are presumed dead or on the brink of death. In Israel’s view, the strike was not only necessary but long overdue.
As pressure has mounted on Israel to reach an agreement with Hamas and Qatar has expressed possible interest in bringing legal action against Israel, it is equally important that reforms and action be taken to clarify the scope of the dual doctrines that have risen to prominence since 9/11. The contours of acceptability should continue to be construed more broadly in cases of countries that have the means and capabilities—but not the political will—to deal with the harboring issue. Important nuances should also be discussed when the nation in question acts as an intermediary between two conflicting parties while hosting one of them. While this discussion is limited and only seeks to introduce the various legal defenses Israel may utilize to defend its conduct, there will undoubtedly be more expansive conversations surrounding this topic, especially if legal action in the ICC commences.
