By: Spencer Robinson
In recent years, professional sports have entered a new phase that few observers fully anticipated: the convergence of billion-dollar private-equity firms and storied franchises that once seemed immune to the rhythms of high finance. The arrival of institutional capital marks a turning point in the business of sport, but the way that arrival is managed matters enormously. A new global tug-of-war has emerged, pitting the U.S. model of tightly regulated franchise ownership against the European model of more expansive institutional participation. The question is not just whether private equity (PE) should play in sports, but how it should play, and what regulators, leagues, and fans stand to learn from each other.
Europe’s Private Equity Moment
In Europe, the floodgates are opening. The Spanish top flight LaLiga made headlines in December 2021 when it struck a deal with the private-equity behemoth CVC Capital Partners. Under the deal, LaLiga’s clubs and league as a whole would receive roughly €1.994 billion in up-front financing in exchange for an 8.2% stake in the league’s broadcast and sponsorship revenue for the next 50 years.
This arrangement, known as “Boost LaLiga” or “LaLiga Impulso,” has been celebrated by some as a bold modernization move, but it has also raised red flags for others. Because the fund gains a slice of future revenue, the question remains whether this is simply liquidity for legacy clubs or the beginning of a deeper transformation of league governance and autonomy. Real Madrid and Athletic Bilbao filed suit against the deal, though a Spanish court dismissed their challenge.
Elsewhere in Europe, similar patterns are evolving. Private equity firms are not only buying clubs outright (for instance, in Italy’s Serie A and other leagues) but also acquiring revenue-rights packages or club networks. One analyst notes that, compared with the U.S., “many European leagues don’t cap private equity ownership” and allow more outright control. The European model, then, offers a relatively open architecture: cash-hungry clubs, high media-rights growth, and fewer institutional walls standing between an investor and a team or league. But with that openness come concerns, such as multi-club ownership, conflicts of interest (especially when clubs under a common fund face each other), and the dilution of traditional fan-centric values.
The U.S. Leagues’ Cautious Approach
By contrast, U.S. sports leagues have historically treated ownership as more than a balance sheet item. Leagues such as the NFL, NBA, and MLB have long operated on the assumption that franchise owners are stewards of community institutions, not simply investors chasing returns. Ownership rules reflect that mindset: the NFL, for instance, until recently forbade institutional and corporate ownership beyond one public exception (the Green Bay Packers) and emphasizes controlling owners with majority voting power and operational oversight.
In the NBA, only a few years ago the rules changed to allow private-equity funds to own minority stakes, but with sharp constraints. One fund may hold up to 20% of a franchise, may have interests in up to five teams, and must stay purely financial in nature (no operational control). MLB has followed suit with its own reform, capping institutional stakes at 30% for any club and restricting fund involvement. In short, U.S. leagues have opened the door to institutional capital, but they have done so through narrow windows. The idea is to allow new capital while maintaining the traditional franchise culture, preserving competitive balance, and avoiding the risks of speculative ownership.
What the U.S. Can Learn from Europe
The global expansion of PE into sports offers several lessons for the United States. First, Europe demonstrates that liquidity can be transformative when paired with strategic guardrails. LaLiga’s €1.994 billion “Impulso” deal with CVC Capital Partners—exchanging upfront capital for an 8.2% share of future media revenues—enabled clubs to reduce debt, improve facilities, and invest in long-term growth. While U.S. leagues have been more cautious, the structure of Europe’s league-wide financing illustrates how collective investment mechanisms can modernize systems traditionally reliant on individual ownership capital. Still, any U.S. adaptation must account for antitrust law, territorial broadcasting rights, and labor agreements, constraints largely absent in Europe.
Second, Europe shows the importance of governance guardrails when opening ownership to institutions. The continent’s permissive environment has driven the rapid rise of multi-club ownership (MCO), in which a single fund or conglomerate holds stakes in multiple clubs across leagues, raising concerns about conflicts of interest and competitive integrity. U.S. leagues have taken the opposite path, permitting only minority fund stakes and imposing strict limits, such as the NBA’s cap of 20% per team and five teams per fund, or MLB’s approval-based institutional caps. The takeaway is clear: allowing private equity requires equally robust oversight.
Finally, the U.S. can learn from Europe’s recognition that modern sports ownership is global by default. PE firms move capital across leagues and continents, investing in teams, media rights, and related entertainment assets. Given this interconnectedness, the U.S. should consider cross-league coordination, potentially through a “sports investment charter” establishing shared standards for transparency, minority-stake limits, and investor vetting. Without such cooperation, governance gaps will widen as institutional ownership expands.
The Middle Ground: A Model for the Future
Private equity is now firmly embedded in global sports; the question is not whether to allow it but how to regulate it responsibly. The United States is well positioned to design a hybrid model that captures the benefits of institutional capital while protecting sport’s competitive and cultural values.
A modernized approach should emphasize transparency, requiring funds to disclose limited partners, cross-team holdings, and governance rights. It should also adopt ownership-diversification limits to prevent any fund from holding controlling interests across multiple franchises, especially where competitive overlap exists. Leagues may further strengthen public trust by incorporating community-stake mechanisms, such as golden shares or community board seats, ensuring fans retain a structural voice when institutional investors enter club governance.
Additionally, leagues should consider use-of-proceeds requirements so that PE capital funds infrastructure, player development, and community programming rather than short-term extraction or leveraged recapitalization. Finally, because sports investment is inherently global, U.S. leagues should pursue cross-border coordination, establishing best-practice standards with major international leagues such as the Premier League, LaLiga, and Serie A.
Together, these measures offer a practical middle ground: a framework that accepts institutional investment while preserving the integrity, identity, and long-term health of the sports ecosystem.
Conclusion
The tug-of-war over private equity in sports is more than a battle for ownership—it is a struggle over identity, values, and the future of competition. In Europe, the model is evolving fast, with clubs and leagues unlocking value via large-scale deals but also taking on new governance risks. In the U.S., leagues have cautiously opened the door, protecting tradition while experimenting with new capital models. If the U.S. is to avoid the pitfalls and benefit from the upside, it should not hide behind reluctance but should instead lead with design. A preemptive, well-structured ownership-reform agenda could set a global standard: institutional capital that supports, rather than supplants, the public trust of the franchise. Because at its best, sport is not just another investment class; it is a shared cultural institution, and that means the rules of ownership must reflect something more than returns.
