By: Yedida Bentolila
In an interview with The New York Times earlier this month, Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic nominee for mayor of New York City, made it clear that if elected, he would instruct the New York Police Department (NYPD) to arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he traveled to the city during his tenure. Mamdani said he would honor the warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2024, which alleges that Netanyahu bears responsibility for war crimes committed during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks. “It is my desire to ensure that this be a city that stands up for international law,” Mamdani said. Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected the allegations as politically motivated. Mamdani later extended the pledge to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has been subject to ICC charges since 2023 for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.
The pledge echoed through New York politics and generated international headlines, opening the door to an unprecedented scenario where municipal authorities might act on an international warrant despite their nation steadfastly refusing to submit to the Court’s authority. This scenario raises a pressing legal question: Can a city enforce the rules of an international court when the federal government isn’t bound by the treaty that created it?
The ICC was established in 1998 by the Rome Statute, a treaty that created the first permanent court to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Today, 125 countries are parties to the Rome Statute and recognize the ICC’s authority. By ratifying the treaty, participating countries commit to cooperating with the Court, including executing arrest warrants issued by its judges. Importantly, neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the treaty. They have consistently rejected the ICC’s authority, citing sovereignty concerns and fears of politically motivated prosecutions. Still, in 2015, Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute, which gave the ICC jurisdiction to investigate the Israel-Gaza conflict.
Since the U.S. never ratified the treaty, American officials are under no legal obligation to enforce ICC decisions. That means even if the ICC warrant is valid internationally, it has no domestic power in the U.S. Foreign affairs have long been recognized as an exclusive power of the federal government, a principle that prevents individual states or cities from pursuing their own foreign policy agendas. Mamdani’s proposal directly conflicts with that doctrine. Even if the ICC had jurisdiction over Netanyahu’s alleged crimes, there is no mechanism for a municipal agency to enforce its orders.
State and municipal governments generally lack independent authority to act on matters of international law that the federal government has explicitly rejected. While mayors technically have command over their city’s police force, their authority is bounded by federal and state law. A mayor cannot unilaterally create or enforce international legal obligations that contradict federal policy.
Legal limits aside, Mamdani’s words carried enough weight to provoke a response from Congress. Within days of the mayoral candidate’s statement, House Republican Leadership Chairwoman Elise Stefanik introduced the “Sovereign Enforcement Integrity Act” to prohibit any local attempt to enforce ICC warrants. The bill would prohibit state and municipal police from executing or honoring any request or indictment issued by the ICC unless explicitly authorized by federal law. In her announcement of the bill, Stefanik framed Mamdani’s comments as both dangerous and unconstitutional, denouncing them as “illegal” and “radical.” The bill makes a clear assertion: foreign relations remain the exclusive domain of the federal government, and international law cannot circumvent that principle through municipal enforcement.
Even states that have ratified the Rome Statute have failed to carry out their obligations. In April 2025, Netanyahu visited Hungary, an ICC member, without incident. The government simply ignored its duty to detain him. Similarly, since the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin in 2023, he has traveled to several countries without being arrested.
Any arrest attempt would be further complicated by diplomatic immunity considerations, as heads of state generally enjoy significant protections under international and U.S. law when visiting on official business. France highlighted this in 2024, explaining that, although it supports the ICC, Netanyahu would still be protected by immunity as the leader of a state that never joined the Court. That legal reality renders Mamdani’s hypothetical order purely symbolic. In this light, Mamdani’s pledge stands out for inverting the common trend of states failing to uphold their duty. Instead of a state neglecting its duty, here we see a local politician promising to act despite having no obligation.
Mamdani’s threat to arrest Netanyahu, however bold it may appear, collapses under the weight of constitutional limits and international law. Stefanik’s bill, even if never enacted, has made it clear that foreign policy is a federal power and ICC warrants carry no force in the U.S. Federal supremacy over foreign affairs, U.S. rejection of the Rome Statute, and doctrines of head-of-state immunity all stand in the way.
So why make a promise that can’t be kept? The answer lies in politics as much as law. Local officials often borrow the language of international justice to signal their values or score political points. What remains uncertain is whether such promises help advance global accountability or just expose how limited it is. If arrest warrants against world leaders cannot be enforced even by countries that signed the Rome Statute, and if they carry no weight in countries that have not, the ICC’s reach is more aspirational than enforceable. In the end, Mamdani’s words highlight the core weakness of international criminal law: arrest warrants are only as strong as the states willing to enforce them.
